Welden L. Daines v. Richard B. Vincent and ASC Group, LC: Brief of Appellees by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Welden L. Daines v. Richard B. Vincent and ASC
Group, LC: Brief of Appellees
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Francis M. Wikstrom; Michael P. Petrogeorge; Parsons Behle and Latimer; Attorneys for Appellees.
John Martinez; Nick J. Colessides; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Daines v. Vincent, No. 20060838 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6804
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WELDEN L. DAINES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
RICHARD B. VINCENT and ASC GROUP, 
L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Supreme Court No. 20060838-SC 
District Court No. 030910378 
Priority No. 15 
Appeal from Orders and Judgment Entered by the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Presiding 
JOHN MARTINEZ (4523) 
2974 East St. Mary's Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Telephone: (801)582-1386 
Facsimile: (801) 582-7664 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (0696) 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Telephone: (801) 521-4441 
Facsimile: (801)521-4452 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Welden L. Daines 
FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (3462) 
MICHAEL P. PETROGEORGE (8870) 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Richard B. Vincent and ASC Group, L.C. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
UTAH 
FILED 
APPELLATE COURTS 
FEB2220M 
cs^cai^ in 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WELDEN L. DAINES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
RICHARD B. VINCENT and ASC GROUP, 
L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Supreme Court No. 20060838-SC 
District Court No. 030910378 
Priority No. 15 
Appeal from Orders and Judgment Entered by the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Presiding 
JOHN MARTINEZ (4523) 
2974 East St. Mary's Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Telephone: (801)582-1386 
Facsimile: (801)582-7664 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (0696) 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Telephone: (801)521-4441 
Facsimile: (801)521-4452 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Welden L. Dairies 
FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (3462) 
MICHAEL P. PETROGEORGE (8870) 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
Richard B. Vincent and ASC Group, L. C. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
926972 10 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
L The Appellant is Welden L. Daines ("Daines" or "Appellant"). Daines was 
the Plaintiff in the proceedings below. 
2. The Appellees are Richard B. Vincent ("Vincent") and ASC Group, L.C. 
("ASC Group"). Vincent and ASC Group were the Defendants in the proceedings below, 
and are collectively referred to herein as "Defendants" or "Appellees." 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court properly grant a directed verdict on all of Daines' 
claims against ASC Group based on the "Conditional Release of Liability" Daines signed 
in December 2001 ("Release")? 
Directed verdicts are appropriate when "the court is able to conclude, as a matter 
of law, that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from the 
evidence presented," and that the moving party is entitled to judgment. Mgmt. Comm. of 
Gray stone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. Gray stone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 
(Utah 1982). Directed verdicts are reviewed de novo, applying the same standard as the 
trial court. See id. at 898. This Court must therefore "examine the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in 
the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of the losing 
party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained." Id. 
Issue 1(a): Did the trial court correctly conclude that the Release was 
unambiguous and could be interpreted as a matter of law? 
Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. See Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). 
Issue 1(b): Did the trial court correctly interpret the Release to relinquish 
all of Daines5 claims against ASC Group? 
926972 10 
Where a contract is unambiguous, its interpretation is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. See Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, If 14, 48 P3d 
918,924. 
Issue 1(c): After considering all extrinsic evidence offered by Daines, 
did the trial court properly determine that there was no latent ambiguity in the Release, 
and that it discharged all of Daines' claims against ASC Group as a matter of law? 
V/hether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. See Alf, 850 P.2d at 1274. "[I]f after considering [extrinsic] evidence, the 
court determines that the language of the contract is not ambiguous, then the parties' 
intentions must be determined solely from the language of the contract." Ward v. 
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995). Where a contract is 
determined to be unambiguous, its interpretation is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. See Peterson, 2002 UT 43 at f 14. 
Issue 2: Did the trial court correctly grant a directed verdict on Daines' 
claims against Vincent, individually, where Daines offered no evidence to prove that 
Vincent dealt with Daines in an individual capacity rather than as a representative of ASC 
Group? 
See supra Issue 1 for applicable standard of review. 
Issue 3: Did the trial court correctly grant a directed verdict on Daines' fraud 
and punitive damage claims where Daines offered no evidence to establish several of the 
essential elements of his claim? 
See supra Issue 1 for applicable standard of review. 
Issue 4: Does the grant of a directed verdict in accordance with the 
standard's set forth in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), and controlling case law, 
violate the losing party's constitutional right to his day in court and/or to a trial by jury? 
Constitutional questions are legal questions reviewed de novo. See Univ. of Utah 
v. Shurtleff, 2006 UT 51, 1f 15, 144 P.3d 1109, 1114. As a general rule, this Court 
"should avoid reaching constitutional issues if the case can be decided on other grounds." 
West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994). 
Issue 5: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of 
findings of fact made by another judge in an unrelated case against Vincent regarding 
Vincent's credibility in that case? 
"A district court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and its 
determination typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of discretion." 
Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ^27, 123 P.3d 416, 425 (quotations omitted). See also 
State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, K 8, 76 P.3d 1165, 1167 ("Although the admission or 
exclusion of evidence is a question of law, we review a district court's decision to admit 
or exclude specific evidence for an abuse of discretion."). This Court will not reverse a 
trial court's decision to exclude evidence "unless it was beyond the limits of 
reasonability." Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, 1J57, 82 P.3d 1076, 1089 
(quotations omitted).1 
1
 Daines cites State v. Pena, 869 P.3d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), for the proposition that 
evidentiary rulings on a motion in limine should be reviewed for correctness. See 
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Issue 6: Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
because the trial court had not yet entered a final judgment. After the trial court entered 
final judgment, Appellees withdrew the motion as moot. Was the motion to dismiss 
brought in good faith and are sanctions appropriate under Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 33(a)? 
Sanctions may be awarded under Rule 33(a) only if the motion to dismiss was 
"frivolous" or made "for delay." 
APPLICABLE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS2 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). 
Utah Rules of Evidence 402, 403, 404, 608, 801 and 802. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
L NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this action, Daines seeks to enforce an oral agreement, and to obtain equity 
shares in the West Valley Surgical Center, LLC, n/k/a the Utah Surgical Center, LLC, 
(the "Surgical Center"), in return for services he rendered in 2000-2001 relating to the 
formation, organization, and development of the Surgical Center. Although ASC Group 
Appellant's Br. 4-5, n. 20. Daines' reliance on Pena is misplaced. Pena was a criminal 
case involving the suppression of evidence on constitutional grounds. Pena does not 
apply in this case and does not supplant the long-applied "abuse of discretion" standard 
applied to evidentiary rulings in civil cases. 
2
 Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6), the relevant provisions of 
these rules are set forth verbatim at Appellees' Addendum, Tabs A-H. 
and Vincent disputed the existence of an oral contract at trial, they acknowledged that the 
trial court should assume the existence of the agreement for purposes of their motion for 
directed verdict. In ruling on Defendants' motion, the trial court assumed the existence 
of the oral agreement, but ruled as a matter of law that Daines signed an unambiguous 
Release by which he voluntarily relinquished any claims he had against the Surgical 
Center and its members, including ASC Group, arising out of or relating to the formation, 
organization, development, or operation of the Surgical Center. Daines received $56,000 
in consideration for the Release. This appeal is directed, for the most part, to the trial 
court's interpretation of the Release. 
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The case was tried to a jury on August 7 and 8, 2006. At the close of Plaintiffs 
case the trial court granted three of Defendants' motions for directed verdict and 
dismissed all of Daines' claims against Defendants on the merits. The first order 
dismissed all of Daines' claims against ASC Group based on the Release signed by 
Daines. (R. at 1661-76.3) 
The second order dismissed all of Daines' claims against Vincent, individually. 
This order was based on the trial court's conclusion that Daines presented no evidence to 
A copy of the trial court's "Order Granting Motion for Directed Verdict on all 
Claims Against ASC Group, L.C." may be found at Addendum Exhibit 19 to Appellant's 
Brief. 
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establish that Vincent had acted or undertaken any obligations in an individual capacity, 
rather than as a representative of ASC Group. (R. at 1657-60.4) 
The third order dismissed Daines' fraud claims against both Defendants. The trial 
court concluded that Daines had presented no evidence to establish several of the 
essential elements of his fraud claim. (R. at 1651-56.) 
The trial court entered its orders granting Defendants' motions, for directed 
verdicts on August 22, 2006. (R. at 1651-76.) The August 22 orders expressly 
contemplated the later entry of a judgment. On September 6, 2006, counsel for 
Defendants served upon counsel for Daines a proposed judgment that included a 
provision awarding costs pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). (R. at 1691-
98.) On September 8, 2006, after a discussion between counsel regarding the proposed 
form of judgment, and before judgment was entered, Daines filed a notice of appeal. (R. 
at 1677-79.) On September 12, 2006, Daines filed objections to the proposed judgment 
asserting, among other things, that his notice of appeal divested the trial court of 
jurisdiction to award Defendants their costs under Rule 54(d). (R. at 1699-1704.5) 
Defendants filed a response to Daines' objections, arguing that the notice of 
appeal was premature and that it did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enter 
4
 A copy of the trial court's "Order Granting Motion for Directed Verdict on all 
Claims Against Richard Vincent, Individually" may be found at Addendum Exhibit 20 to 
Appellant's Brief. 
5
 A copy of the trial court's "Order Granting Motion for Directed Verdict on 
Plaintiffs Claims for Fraudulent Inducement and Punitive Damages" may be found at 
Addendum Exhibit 21 to Appellant's Brief. 
judgment and to award costs. (R. at 1691-98.) On September 15, 2006, Defendants filed 
a motion in this Court to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because final 
judgment had not been entered below.6 (Sup. Ct. Docket No. 7.) Daines responded on 
September 21, 2006, claiming that the motion was frivolous and requesting sanctions. 
(Sup. Ct. Docket No. 9.) On October 23, 2005, this Court entered an order deferring 
ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss and Daines' request for sanctions "until plenary 
presentation on the merits." (Sup. Ct. Docket No. 16.) 
Daines also appeals from the trial court's resolution of pre-trial motions in limine 
relating to the admissibility of certain findings of fact entered by Judge Robert K. Hilder 
in an unrelated case styled Libscomb v. Vincent, et al, in which Judge Hilder found, 
among other things, that "Vincent is not a credible witness." ^Libscomb Order"). The 
trial court held a hearing on the motions in limine on March 23, 2006, and entered an 
order on April 5, 2006, granting Defendants' cross motion and ordering Daines and his 
counsel "not to use or refer to the Libscomb Order in his case-in-chief, during cross-
examination, or at any other time during trial." (R. at 965.) Daines did not call Vincent 
as a witness at trial. 
Appellees' motion to dismiss was rendered moot by the trial court's entry of 
judgment on October 11, 2006. (R. 1717-19.) Appellees learned of the entry of 
judgment on October 23, 2006, and promptly notified this Court and withdrew their 
motion to dismiss as moot. See October 24, 2006, Letter from Michael P. Petrogeorge to 
Pat Bartholomew, Clerk of the Court. (Sup. Ct Docket No. 18.) 
A copy of the Libscomb Order may be found at Addendum Exhibit 4 to Appellant's 
Brief. 
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III. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Background Facts 
ASC Group is in the business of organizing, developing and managing surgical 
centers. (R. at 1064.) Richard Vincent founded ASC Group and was, at all relevant 
times, its Chairman. (Id.) 
Plaintiff is a retired Certified Public Accountant who has provided accounting, tax 
preparation, and investment consulting services to a number of physicians during the 
course of his career. (Tr.9 44-46.) Daines developed a long-standing professional 
relationship with one of his physician clients, Dr. Douglas Burrows. (Id. at 222-23.) Dr. 
Burrows paid Daines a monthly retainer to act as his financial advisor, and Daines 
conceded that he owed Dr. Burrows fiduciary duties. (Id. at 110-12, 238-39.) 
In 2000 Dr. Burrows asked Daines to assist him and his colleagues in finding a 
company that could help them set up a surgical center. (Id. at 48-49, 111, 169.) Daines 
approached ASC Group in September 2000. (Id. at 49.) Unbeknownst to Dr. Burrows, 
Daines refused to introduce the doctors to ASC Group unless and until ASC Group 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding and Non-Disclosure Agreement ("MOU") 
agreeing that ASC Group, or the Surgical Center to be formed, would pay Daines a 
8
 The following facts were undisputed at trial. Many of these facts are taken from the 
extensive findings the trial court made in connection with its ruling on the motions for 
directed verdict. (See R. at 1661-76.) Daines does not challenge any of the trial court's 
factual findings on appeal, except as they relate to the interpretation of the Release. 
These facts will be marshaled in the light most favorable to Daines. 
9
 The Trial Transcript consists of two volumes. Volume I contains pages 1-121 (R. at 
1726), and Volume II contains pages 122-322 (R. at 1727). 
$150,000 finder's fee for introducing ASC Group and the physicians and assisting with 
the due diligence and feasibility determination. (Id. at 112-14, 242-43.) Under the terms 
of the MOU, the finder's fee would be payable $50,000 upon start-up of the surgical 
center, with the balance in 24 equal monthly installments thereafter. (Id. at 148; Trial Ex. 
210.) 
Vincent signed the MOU on behalf of ASC Group. (Trial Ex. 2.) After the MOU 
was signed, Daines forwarded to ASC Group a list containing the names, addresses, and 
practice specialties of approximately thirty doctors who might be interested in forming 
the Surgical Center. (Tr. 53-56.) Most of the information on this list came from Dr. 
Burrows and his colleagues. (Id. at 114-15, 246-47.) Daines also assisted with due 
diligence and obtained information used in the feasibility determination. 
Dr. Burrows did not learn of the existence of the MOU until months after this 
litigation commenced, which was more than three years after the MOU was signed and 
months after the Surgical Center began operations. (Id. at 232-33, 241-42.) According to 
Dr. Burrows, neither he nor the other doctors would have agreed to pay Daines a finder's 
fee for introducing them to ASC Group. (Id. at 245.) 
From late September through November 2000, ASC Group principals met on 
several occasions with Daines and the group of doctors who were interested in forming a 
surgical center, prepared a preliminary feasibility study, and drafted the initial term sheet 
Although the stipulated and admitted trial exhibits are part of the official record on 
appeal, they have not yet been given record number pagination. 
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for the proposed Surgical Center. {Id. at 56-66; see also Trial Ex. 3 (initial Proposed 
Term Sheet), Trial Ex. 24 (Feasibility Study), Trial Ex. 26 (Informational Brochure).) 
The doctors met with Daines in December 2000. (Tr. 78, 141.) During that 
meeting they discussed the fact that it would be a direct conflict of interest for Daines to 
represent both ASC Group and the doctors in the negotiations surrounding the formation 
of the Surgical Center, or for Daines to represent the doctors while he was receiving a fee 
from ASC Group. {Id. at 233-35, 247-48.) It was agreed that Daines would therefore 
proceed to represent only the doctors in the negotiations for the Surgical Center. {Id. at 
248-49.) 
Daines testified that he met with Vincent on December 13, 2000, and that Vincent 
orally agreed that ASC Group would transfer to Daines eight of the twenty units of 
ownership ("Shares") that ASC Group would ultimately hold if the Surgical Center were 
to be formed. {Id. at 80.) Daines testified that the consideration for the oral agreement 
was his relinquishment of his right to receive the ^ > 150,000 finder's fee pursuant to the 
MOU.11 No document reflects or mentions an oral agreement. (Id. at 132-36.) There are 
11
 The trial court found that there was "barely a scintilla of evidence, consisting solely 
of the testimony of Plaintiff, that Plaintiff and ASC Group entered into [the] oral 
agreement." (R. at 1661-76.) The court additionally noted: 
The Court has serious doubts whether there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence to support a finding that an enforceable oral contract was formed 
and doubts that any reasonable jury could so find. But it is not necessary to 
make this determination in order to resolve the motion for a directed 
verdict. Accordingly, and for purposes of this motion, the Court will 
assume that the alleged oral agreement was made. 
{Id at 1668.) 
no notes of the meeting. (Id. at 132-33.) There is no confirmatory letter or email. (Id. at 
133-34.) In the winter of 2000-2001, Daines did not mention the existence of an oral 
agreement to any of the doctors or anyone at ASC Group (other than the conversation 
with Richard Vincent on December 13). (Id. at 134-35.) None of the term sheets 
exchanged between ASC Group and the doctors mentions an oral agreement. (Trial Exs. 
3, 4, 8, 52, 54.) 
On December 20, 2000, one week after Daines said the oral agreement was made, 
Daines met with Vincent and Bruce Heywood, another principal of ASC Group. (Tr. 
139.) The only notes of that meeting indicate there was a discussion about "4 shares" or 
"pay the fee5' to Daines. (Trial Exs. 34, 65.) There is no reference to eight Shares or an 
oral agreement having been made. (Id.) 
On January 4, 2001, Daines had a conversation with Vincent in which he told 
Vincent that he had "torn up" the MOU and would be working solely for the doctors. 
(Tr. 141-42; Trial Ex. 32.) The only notes from this conversation contain no reference to 
an oral agreement for eight Shares. (Trial Ex. 32.) 
On January 10, 2001, Daines sent an email to Vincent in which he was 
negotiating, on behalf of the doctors and against ASC Group, some of the critical terms 
that needed to be decided before the Surgical Center could be formed. (Tr. 142-45; Trial 
Ex.73.) Among the terms set forth in the email, Daines wrote: "Nothing for me." (Trial 
Ex. 73.) Although the initial term sheets in November 2000 referenced a payment to 
Daines in the form of $150,000 cash or equity (Trial Exs. 3, 4), none of the term sheets 
prepared after November, up to and including the final term sheet signed by ASC Group 
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and the doctors in February 2001, provides for any type of compensation to Daines. (Tr. 
130-31, 145-46, 150; Trial Exs. 3, 4, 8, 52, 54.) 
During the course of the negotiations between ASC Group and Daines (on behalf 
of the doctors), Daines negotiated aggressively and was able to get, inter alia, a $100,000 
reduction in ASC Group's development fee, and a reduction in the initial term of its 
management agreement from ten to five years. (Tr. at 76-77, 149, 231, 249-50; Trial 
Exs. 3, 5, 8.) Daines admitted that he worked to negotiate the best deal he could for the 
doctors because he owed them a fiduciary obligation. (Tr. 76-77, 138.) All of the gains 
that Daines negotiated for the doctors came at the expense of ASC Group. (Id. at 149.) 
After the final term sheet was signed in February 2001 (Trial Ex. 8), a Private 
Placement Memorandum ("PPM") was prepared. (Trial. Ex. 56.) This document 
allowed for only two classes of Shares—"Class I" and "Class II." The PPM further 
provided that only physicians could hold Class I Shares, that only ASC Group could 
purchase and hold Class II Shares, and that no one other than ASC Group could hold 
more than five Shares. (Trial Ex. 56 at BUR000014, BUR000021; Tr. 252-56.) The 
PPM also provided that no member could transfer their Shares in the Surgical Center. 
(Trial Ex. 56 at BUR000066.) Under the express language of the PPM, the transfer of 
eight Shares from ASC Group to Daines would not have been permitted unless such a 
transaction was later authorized by the Board of Managers of the Surgical Center. (Trial 
Ex. 56 at BUR000022, BUR000066; Tr. 151-52, 255-56.)12 
Once the operating company for the Surgical Center had been formed the parties 
turned their attention to finding a site for the Surgical Center. (Tr. 98.) The doctors 
asked Daines to explore possible sites for the Surgical Center. {Id. at 98-99.) Daines 
hoped to be the developer of the project, and undertook these efforts knowing that he 
would be compensated only if he was selected as developer. {Id. at 99, 257-59.) 
Daines was not selected as developer. On September 25, 2001, the decision was 
made to build the Surgical Center at a site near the Granger Clinic that was controlled by 
The Boyer Company ("Boyer"), and to use Boyer as developer. {Id. at 101, 153-54.) 
There is no evidence that Daines did any work for or on behalf of Boyer. 
The day of the selection, Daines was "feeling uncomfortable" so he called Vincent 
to inquire when he was going to receive his eight Shares. {Id. at 106-08.) Vincent's 
response was: "What eight Shares?" {Id. at 108, 155.) Daines testified that he 
understood the phone call to mean that Vincent was "trying to chisel me on the eight 
shares." {Id. at 108.) Daines' handwritten notes, made around September 25, 2001, do 
not reflect any agreement to give him eight Shares. (Tr. 157; Trial Ex. 64.) Rather, they 
say: "All we asked for me [was] 8 units." (Trial Ex. 64 (emphasis added).) 
The PPM restrictions are also set forth in the Operating Agreement for West Valley 
Surgical Center, LLC, dated April 11, 2001 ("Operating Agreement"). (Trial Ex. 57.) 
Facts Relating to the Release 
Following the selection of the Boyer site, the members of the Board of Managers 
for the Surgical Center decided to pay Daines $50,000 for his services related to the 
Surgical Center. (Tr. 101-02; Trial Ex. 62.) They determined that this money would be 
paid by Boyer out of its developer's fee once the facility was constructed and in 
operation. (Trial Ex. 62.) 
On October 29, 2001, Daines sent Dr. Burrows, his client and a member of the 
Board of Managers for the Surgical Center, a faxed message stating: "Since we are done 
with our work on W[est] V[alley] we would appreciate seeing if you can get immediate 
payment from Boyer." (Trial Ex. 80.13) Attached to the fax was a letter to Boyer in 
which Plaintiff states: "As we agreed verbally, Bob Smith and I will accept $50,000.00 
as payment for our services. I believe we have finished our work at this time and should 
be paid." (Id.) 
On November 1, 2001, Daines sent ASC Group, as manager of the Surgical 
Center, an "Invoice #9." He wrote on the invoice: "$50,000 promised by Boyer 
Company for Work on Different Sites for WV S[urgical] Cfenter] building." (Trial Ex. 
10.14) The invoice also indicated $6,000 due as "partial fee for building portion WV City 
balance $44,000.00 payable upon signing of lease." (Id.) 
A copy of Trial Ex. 80 may be found at Addendum Exhibit 10 to Appellant's Brief. 
A copy of Trial Ex. 10 may be found at Addendum Exhibit 24 to Appellant's Brief. 
On December 105 2001, more than a month after Invoice #9 was sent to the 
Surgical Center, Dr. David McCray, Chairman of West Valley Surgical Center, LLC, 
sent Daines a letter re "Invoice #9" stating, in relevant part: 
Thank you for the services you rendered to West Valley Surgical Center, 
LLC during the due diligence and organizational phase of the 
development. Check Number 1010 in the amount of $6,000.00 
representing payment towards your fee totaling $50,000 has been prepared 
by West Valley Surgical Center, LLC. The check will be sent you 
immediately upon receipt of the conditional release form attached to this 
letter. 
As you know, The Boyer Company, Developer, will pay the balance upon 
commencement of the lease for the project. 
(Trial Ex. 10 (emphasis added).) 
Enclosed with this letter was the proposed Release. (Id.) The operative portion of 
the Release provides: 
We, Welden L. Daines and Robert Smith, do hereby conditionally release 
West Valley Surgical Center, LLC or any of its members from any and all 
liabilities and or claims in connection with services provided by us for the 
due diligence, acquisition of real estate, or any other services rendered 
to date for West Valley Surgical Center, or on behalf of its members, for 
the organization, development and operation of an ambulatory surgical 
center in the West Valley and any services connected with the same. 
This release encompasses and satisfies any prior agreements and 
discussions whether written or verbal by West Valley Surgical Center, 
LLC or any of its members. 
(Id. (emphasis added).) 
Dr. Burrows saw the Release before it was sent to Daines, and testified that it was 
intended to protect the Surgical Center and its members from any continuing 
responsibilities or liabilities to Daines for anything having to do with the Surgical Center. 
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(Tr. 265-67.) He also testified that ASC Group was, "by definition/' a member of the 
Surgical Center. (Id.) 
Daines read and signed the Release without requesting any changes. (Id. at 103, 
162.) Daines is a sophisticated businessman and certified public accountant, and testified 
that he was not under any duress or disability when he signed the Release. (Id. at 163.) 
Daines and his witnesses testified that Daines had performed various services prior 
to signing the Release. These included services related to "due diligence," "acquisition 
of real estate," and other services relating to the "organization," "development" and 
"operation" of the Surgical Center. (Id at 157-59 (Daines), 179-182 (Robert Smith), 213 
(Scott Stuart) & 260-64 (Dr. Burrows).) Their description of the services rendered by 
Daines coincides exactly with the services recited in the Release. (Trial Ex. 35.) 
It is undisputed that when the Release was signed, the membership of West Valley 
Surgical Center, LLC included approximately 20 individual physicians and ASC Group. 
(Tr. 266-67.) The November 2000 term sheets for the Surgical Center and every term 
sheet thereafter identified ASC Group as a member of what would become West Valley 
Surgical Center, LLC. (Trial Exs. 3, 4, 8, 52, 54.) Daines received and reviewed these 
term sheets on behalf of the doctors and knew that ASC Group would be a member of the 
Surgical Center once it was formed. (Tr. 73, 75, 145-46, 148-50.) The Surgical Center 
was formed in April 2001, eight months before the Release was signed. (Trial Ex. 57.) 
The Release was conditioned only on the receipt of future payments. (Trial Ex. 
35.) Daines received those payments in the form of a check for $6,000 from West Valley 
Surgical Center, LLC, and a check for $50,000 from Boyer. (Tr. 102, 163; Trial Exs. 61, 
63.15) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Release is clear and unambiguous on its face, and discharged all of Daines' 
claims against ASC Group. The Release discharged all of the "members" of West Valley 
Surgical Center, LLC. It is undisputed that ASC Group was one of approximately twenty 
members of the limited liability company when the Release was signed, and that Daines 
knew of ASC Group's status as a member prior to signing the Release. 
On its face, the Release applies to any claims arising out of services Daines 
performed relating to the Surgical Center, including any services he provided during the 
due diligence, acquisition of real estate, organization, development, and operation of the 
Surgical Center. The plain language of the Release further applied to encompass and 
satisfy any prior agreements Daines may have had with members of the Surgical Center, 
including ASC Group. Whether this language is labeled as an "integration clause" or a 
"scope" clause, its effect is to discharge the alleged agreement with ASC Group to give 
Daines eight Shares of the Surgical Center. 
There is no legal distinction between "pre-Surgical Center ASC" and "Surgical 
Center ASC" insofar as the terms of the Release are concerned because the scope of the 
Release expressly includes both "pre-Surgical Center" services (due diligence, 
15
 A copy of the $6,000 check from West Valley Surgical Center, LLC may be found 
at Addendum Exhibit 15 to Appellant's Brief, and a copy of the $50,000 check from 
Boyer may be found at Addendum Exhibit 13 to Appellant's Brief. 
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organization, and development) and "post-Surgical Center" services (acquisition of real 
estate and operation of the Surgical Center). Daines' argument regarding the purportedly 
different legal capacities of ASC Group was raised for the first time on appeal and has no 
support in the evidence. 
The trial court gave Daines the opportunity to present whatever evidence he had to 
prove his alternative interpretation of the language of the Release. Daines failed to 
present any evidence, let alone "reasonable and plausible" evidence, to support an 
alternative interpretation. Daines did not testify about his own interpretation. The 
invoice Daines points to as supportive of his interpretation is inconsistent with the 
responsive letter from the Surgical Center and the express language of the Release Daines 
signed. The trial court properly determined that there was no reasonable and plausible 
extrinsic evidence to establish an ambiguity, and that the Release applied, as a matter of 
law, to discharge Daines' claims against ASC Group. 
The trial court was also correct in granting a directed verdict on Daines' claims 
against Vincent, individually. There is no evidence in the record to support a claim that 
Vincent promised as an individual to give Daines eight Shares in the Surgical Center. 
The only evidence offered by Daines was that Vincent, as Chairman of the Board, made 
the promise on behalf of ASC Group. Vincent did not personally own any Shares and, 
according to the organizational documents of the Surgical Center, could not have 
purchased or owned eight Shares as an individual. 
The directed verdict on Daines' claim for fraud and punitive damages should also 
be upheld. Daines failed to introduce any evidence that Defendants did not intend to 
honor the alleged promise to give Daines eight Shares. The only evidence cited by 
Daines—the later organizational documents Daines helped negotiate that did not allow 
for Daines to hold eight Shares—is not evidence of the intention of ASC Group at the 
time the promise was allegedly made. Moreover, Daines failed to present evidence that 
he reasonably and detrimentally relied on the promise. Once it became apparent to 
Daines that he could not hold and would not receive eight Shares, there was nothing to 
prevent him from asserting his claim to $150,000 under the MOU (until such time as he 
signed the Release). 
Daines argues that by granting any of the directed verdicts, the trial court deprived 
him of his constitutional rights to his day in court and/or to a trial by jury. The grant of a 
directed verdict in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) and the standards 
articulated by this Court after the plaintiff has had an opportunity to present his case-in-
chief, does not violate the constitution. 
This Court should also affirm the trial court's order excluding all references to the 
Libscomb Order at trial. As a threshold matter, Daines' briefing on the issue is 
inadequate, and this Court should decline to even address it. On the merits, the Libscomb 
Order is inadmissible under Utah Rules of Evidence 402, 403, 404, 608, 801 and/or 802. 
Even if the Libscomb Order were admissible, however, any error was harmless because 
Vincent was never called as a witness at trial, and his credibility was never put at issue. 
Finally, this Court should deny Appellant's request for sanctions. Appellees' 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was brought in good faith, and in 
accordance with controlling law. Although that motion has now been withdrawn as 
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moot, it was properly asserted at the time and was not frivolous or asserted for the 
purpose of delay. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED A VERDICT ON DAINES' 
CLAIMS AGAINST ASC GROUP BECAUSE THE RELEASE 
DISCHARGED ALL OF THESE CLAIMS, 
Daines' arguments regarding the meaning and effect of the Release are somewhat 
confusing and contradictory. He argues at various points: 
• 
• 
The Release is unenforceable because there was no meeting of the minds on 
the identity of the parties. (Appellant's Br. 33-34.) This issue was not 
raised at trial and it is not properly before the Court on appeal. See Smith v. 
Four Comers Mental Health Ctr.9 2003 UT 23, ^ 19, 70 P.3d 904, 911 
(quoting Treffv. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, ] 9 n. 4, 26 P.3d 212) ('"We will 
not address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal.'")16 
The Release is unambiguous on its face and does not discharge ASC 
Group in its "pre-Surgical Center ASC" legal capacity. (Appellant's Br. 
35-37.) 
Interpreted with the aid of extrinsic evidence, the Release is unambiguous 
and does not discharge ASC Group in its "pre-Surgical Center ASC" legal 
capacity. (Appellant's Br. 37-38.) 
16
 Daines suggests that the issue was preserved because he raised it in opposition to 
Defendants' first motion for summary judgment. (Appellant's Br. 34 n. 106.) But he did 
not raise the issue at trial. See 438 Main St v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, i 51, 99 P.3d 
801, 813 ("Issues that are not raised at trial are usually deemed waived."). Accordingly, 
the trial court never had the opportunity to actually consider the issue. See Brookside 
Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 1f 14, 48 P.3d 968, 972 ("[0]nce trial 
counsel has raised an issue before the trial court, and the trial court has considered the 
issue, the issue is preserved for appeal."). More importantly, Daines did not offer any 
evidence at trial to show his different understanding of the parties covered by the 
Release. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence established that ASC Group was a 
member of the Surgical Center and that Daines knew it when the Release was signed. In 
the absence of any contrary evidence from Daines, no reasonable jury could conclude that 
there was not a meeting of the minds concerning the parties covered by the Release. 
• The Release is unambiguous on its face and does not discharge ASC 
Group from claims other than breach of contract, (Appellant's Br. 38-39.) 
• The Release is ambiguous as to the identity of the parties released and the 
scope of the claims released. (Appellant's Br. 39-41.) 
• The Release is ambiguous concerning the scope and meaning of the 
"integration" clause. (Appellant's Br. 41-43.) 
For the reasons set forth below, each of these arguments should be rejected, and the 
directed verdict should be affirmed. 
A. The Release Is Unambiguous on Its Face and Discharged Ail of Daines' 
Claims Against ASC Group. 
The Release is a contract and is governed by the general rules applied in contract 
actions. See Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311,312 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). uIn interpreting 
a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 
P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). "If the contract is in writing and the language is not 
ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the 
agreement J' Id. at 108. 
"Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law." Alfv. State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). "A contract provision is ambiguous 
if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation." Winegar; 813 P.2d at 108, 
"A contract may be ambiguous because it is unclear, omits terms, or 'the terms used to 
express the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings.'" Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exck, 2006 UT 20, ^ 15, 133 P.3d 428, 432 (quoting 
Alf, 850 P.2d at 1274). Words in a contract are not ambiguous "simply because one party 
seeks to endow them with a different interpretation according to his or her own interests." 
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Id. If 17. "[T]o merit consideration as an interpretation that creates an ambiguity, the 
alternative rendition 'must be based upon the usual and natural meaning of the language 
used and may not be the result of a forced or strained construction.9" Id. (quoting Home 
Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 367 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
Daines signed the Release in December 2001, agreeing that in exchange for the 
payment of $50,000 he would release: 
[The Surgical Center] or any of its members from any and all liabilities 
and or claims in connection with services provided by [Daines] for the due 
diligence, acquisition of real estate, or any other services rendered to date 
for West Valley Surgical Center, or on behalf of its members, for the 
organization, development and operation of an ambulatory surgical center 
in the West Valley and any services connected with the same. 
(Trial Ex. 10). The Release goes on to state that it "encompasses and satisfies any prior 
agreements and discussions whether written or verbal [by the Surgical Center] or any of 
its members." (Id.) 
On its face, the Release includes any claims arising out of any services Daines 
performed relating to the Surgical Center, including any services he provided to the 
members of the Surgical Center during its due diligence, organization, and development 
(i.e., before they were actually "members"). The plain language of the Release further 
satisfies any then-existing agreements Daines may have had with the Surgical Center or 
any of its members (including the MOU and the oral agreement). The Release was 
conditioned only upon the payment of certain sums by or on behalf of the Surgical 
Center, and Daines admits that he received these payments. (Tr. 102, 163.) It is 
undisputed that ASC Group was a member of the Surgical Center along with the 
individual physicians when the Release was signed, and that Daines knew full well who 
the members were when he signed it. 
Daines initially concedes that the Release is unambiguous and can be interpreted 
as a matter of law. ^Appellant's Br. 33-38.) He argues, however, that the Release did not 
discharge ASC Group in its "pre-Surgical Center" legal capacity. This argument must be 
rejected. 
As a threshold matter, the issue of whether there is a legally recognizable 
distinction between "pre-Surgical Center ASC" and "Surgical Center ASC," insofar as 
the Release is concerned, was raised for the first time on appeal. The argument was not 
properly preserved below, and should not be considered on appeal. 
In any event, there is no evidence in the record to support the distinction Daines 
attempts to make. The Release uses the phrase "Surgical Center and/or its members" to 
identify the group of persons being released. The Surgical Center is a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, and the term "member" is defined by the Utah Revised Limited 
17
 At oral argument on Defendants' motion for directed verdict, Daines argued that 
the Release of the Surgical Center did not apply because the eight Share agreement "was 
a deal between Mr. Daines and ASC, a totally separate entity." (Tr. 290.) Daines made 
no distinction between "pre-Surgical Center ASC" and "Surgical Center ASC," and never 
argued that the Release applied to ASC Group in some legal capacities but not others. 
(Id). Indeed, Daines argued that the Release did not apply to ASC Group at all. (Id. at 
275-77.) Daines claims that the issue was raised in his memorandum opposing 
Defendants' first motion for summary judgment. (Appellant's Br. 34 n. 107.) A review 
of that memorandum reveals no discussion of "pre-Surgical Center ASC" or 'Surgical 
Center ASC," however, and no assertion that the Release applied to ASC in some 
capacities but not others. (R. at 122-79.) Even if the issue had been raised in the 
opposing memorandum, it would not have preserved the issue for appeal. See infra n. 10. 
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Liability Company Act to mean "a person [individual or entity] with an ownership right 
in the company.5' Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-102(14), (17). It is undisputed that ASC 
Group and the individual physicians were "members" of the Surgical Center at the time 
the Release was executed, and that Daines knew it. As such, there can be no ambiguity 
as to the identity of the parties being released.18 
Indeed, if Daines' interpretation were correct—that the Release only applied to 
"post-Surgical Center" obligations—there would have been no reason to include the term 
"members" in the Release. A Utah limited liability company is a legal entity distinct 
from its members. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-104. Utah law makes it clear that 
members of a limited liability company are not personally liable for the obligations or 
liabilities of the company (except for certain exceptions that do not apply here). See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-601, 602. Accordingly, the members of a Utah limited liability 
company are released by operation of law if the company itself is released. 
The logical fallacy in Daines' argument was revealed during oral argument on the 
motions for directed verdict, during which Daines' counsel suggested that the Release 
would apply to the individual physician members without distinguishing between their 
"pre-member" and "member" status. See Tr. at 275 ("[The Release] is perfectly effective 
with respect[] to claims that Mr. Daines might have had against the doctors. We're not 
suing the doctors"); id. at 277 ("There was no testimony whatsoever, from any witness, 
that the release applfies] to anything else but claims by Mr. Daines against the doctors or 
against the center."). As with ASC Group, the individual doctors are not referenced by 
name in the Release. If the Release applies to the individual physicians at all it is because 
they, like ASC Group, were members of the Surgical Center. There is no rational basis to 
distinguish ASC Group from the individual physicians, or to argue that the Release 
applies to some of the Surgical Center's "members" and not to others. 
"Established rules of contract interpretation require consideration of each of its 
provisions in connection with others and, if possible, to give effect to all; effect is to be 
given entire agreement without ignoring any part thereof" Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co., 
575 P.2d 192, 192 (Utah 1978). The only reason to include "members" in the Release is 
to make sure that, in addition to releasing Daines' claims against the Surgical Center 
(which by operation of law also releases members in their capacity as members), he was 
also releasing any claims he had against the members in a personal capacity that fell 
within the scope of the Release. Thus, the effect of identifying both the Surgical Center 
and its members as parties to be covered by the Release is to preclude the very argument 
Daines is now making. 
Daines' argument, although expressed in terms of the legal capacity of the parties 
being released, is really directed to the intended scope of the Release. He argues that 
because the eight Shares agreement was made in December 2000, before the Surgical 
Center was actually formed as a limited liability company, and before ASC Group 
became a "member/5 the Release does not apply to "pre-Surgical Center ASC." But this 
argument cannot stand in the face of the express language of the Release. The Release 
specifically includes claims for services relating to "due diligence," and for the 
"organization [and] development" of the Surgical Center. (Trial Ex. 35.) These services 
are, by definition, "pre-Surgical Center," that is, they pre-dated formation of the Surgical 
Center. Since the express language of the Release includes claims for services that had to 
have been rendered prior to the time the Surgical Center was formed as an LLC, and 
before it had any members, Daines cannot now argue that the Release does not apply to 
926972 10 9 ^ 
claims against "pre-Surgical Center ASC." Likewise, because the express language of 
the Release encompasses both claims for "pre-membership" services (due diligence, 
organization, and development) and "post-membership" services (acquisition of real 
estate and operation of the Surgical Center), it will not support the interpretation Daines 
is now trying to force upon it.19 
In sum, the trial court properly concluded that the Release was unambiguous on its 
face, and correctly interpreted it to discharge any claims Daines may have had against 
ASC Group relating to the Surgical Center, including his claim for eight Shares under the 
Daines cites to cases standing for the general proposition that a person or entity can 
have different legal capacities, and that action taken in one legal capacity does not 
necessarily constitute action taken in another. (Appellant's Br. 30 n. 94, n. 95.) None of 
these cases involve the interpretation of a release or facts similar to this case. See, e.g., 
Swan Creek Village Homeowners Ass'n v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, ^23, 134 P.3d 1122, 
1127 (when plaintiff amended complaint to name daughter as real party in interest, father 
stopped acting in personal capacity and began acting as agent for daughter); Raile Family 
Trust v. Promax Dev. Corp., 2001 UT 40, \ 11, 24 P.3d 980, 983 (claims asserted by trust 
in current action were compulsory counterclaims which trustees failed to assert in prior 
action, and were therefore properly dismissed on summary judgment pursuant to Rule 
13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; trustees could not avoid summary judgment 
by arguing that they acted solely in an individual capacity in the prior suit); Pepper v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 801 P.2d 144, 151-52 (Utah 1990) (probate order 
discharging Zions Bank as executor does not preclude later claim against Zions Bank as 
trustee for failure to assert a claim on behalf of the trust against Zions Bank as executor 
for dissipating trust assets; although Zions served both as executor and trustee, it owed 
independent and separate fiduciary duties in each of its legal capacities; discharge in its 
capacity as executor did not absolve Zions of separate fiduciary obligation, as trustee, to 
protect and preserve the beneficiaries' interests, even though Zions had to challenge its 
own conduct as executor); In re Stevens' Estate, 130 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 1942) 
(administrator of estate acted in his capacity as an officer of a corporation, rather than in 
his personal capacity, in presenting claim to estate, and thus did not violate statute 
requiring administrator to present personal claims to court for approval prior to payment). 
alleged oral agreement. As such, the trial court appropriately granted a directed verdict in 
favor of ASC Group on all of his claims for relief. 
B. The Trial Court Considered AH Extrinsic Evidence Offered by Daines 
and Properly Determined That the Release Was Not Ambiguous as a 
Matter of Law and Discharged Daines' Claims Against ASC Group. 
Daines next argues that the Release, if interpreted with the aid of extrinsic 
evidence, is unambiguous and does not discharge ASC Group in its "pre-Surgical Center 
ASC" legal capacity. (Appellant's Br. 37-38.) The trial court twice denied ASC Group's 
motion for summary judgment on the Release. 
In denying summary judgment below, the trial court apparently believed that it 
was required by this Court's decision in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 
264 (Utah 1995), to consider any extrinsic evidence proffered by a party to determine 
whether a contract is ambiguous. In Ward, the Court stated: "When determining whether 
Daines suggests that the Release applies, if at all, only to his claims for breach of 
contract. But Daines' other claims for fraudulent inducement, negligent 
misrepresentation, promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment are all premised on his 
claim that he was improperly induced to give up his right to receive $150,000 under the 
MOU. The MOU itself is a prior contract that was satisfied by the express language of 
the Release and it also related to services Daines provided ASC Group in connection with 
the due diligence, formation and organization of the Surgical Center. Accordingly, his 
other claims are also discharged by the express language of the Release. 
The fact that the trial court declined to enter summary judgment in favor of ASC Group 
has no preclusive effect at trial nor any significance in this appeal. A trial court has the 
discretion to reconsider and reverse any previously issued decision at any time prior to 
the entry of a final judgment. See, e.g., Brookside, 2002 UT 48 at ^ 18. The prior rulings 
were made by the trial court on motions for summary judgment. At that stage of the 
proceedings the trial court was required to accept all of Daines' proffered evidence as 
true, and to allow Daines his day in court if there was any potentially admissible evidence 
that could be used to establish a latent ambiguity and avoid application of the Release. 
Daines offered no such evidence. 
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a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered." Id. at 268 (holding 
that the release was ambiguous as to whether it covered damages to a 19-acre field that 
was planted in safflowers or damages for the crop of safflowers only). Two Justices were 
critical of the breadth of the Court's language (Russon, J. concurring in result; 
Zimmerman, C.J., dissenting). Both lamented the Court's apparent departure from the 
"long-standing rule" that a court must first determine, as a matter of law, whether an 
ambiguity exists before considering extrinsic evidence. Id. 
Recently., this Court had occasion to revisit the issue of contract interpretation in 
Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 2006 UT 20, 133 P.3d 428. Without citing Ward, the 
unanimous Court in Saleh followed orthodox principles of contract interpretation. Id. at f^ 
15. Rather than requiring trial courts to consider "any relevant [extrinsic] evidence" to 
determine ambiguity, the Saleh Court imposed a threshold requirement that a party 
arguing for an alternative interpretation must first advance an interpretation that is 
"'plausible and reasonable in light of the language used.'" Id. at f 17 (quoting First Am. 
Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah 1998)). 
In the case at bar, Daines was able to avoid summary judgment because the trial 
court applied the "any relevant evidence [of intent]" test set forth in Ward. At trial, 
Daines had the opportunity to offer extrinsic evidence to support a "reasonable" and 
"plausible" alternative interpretation of the Release. See id. at f 15; Winegar, 813 P.2d at 
108. Daines failed to meet his burden under Saleh to offer evidence that would 
reasonably support the interpretation of the Release he now urges, and, accordingly, the 
trial court properly interpreted the unambiguous language of the Release to bar his claims 
against ASC Group as a matter of law. 
1. Marshaled Evidence of Ambiguity. 
The only testimony offered by Daines on the subject of the Release can be found 
at pages 101-103 and 157-63 of the transcript. Marshaling that evidence in favor of 
Daines is a straightforward task: 
By the end of September 2001 Daines had completed all his services relating to 
due diligence, feasibility studies, organization, acquisition of real estate, site selection, 
and operation of the Surgical Center. (Tr. 157-59.) By that time, Daines also knew that 
ASC Group did not intend to give him eight Shares. (Tr. 107-08.) 
On October 29, 2001, Daines sent a fax to Dr. Burrows asking for his assistance in 
getting immediate payment from Boyer because Daines was "old and the future payment 
is probably of little value to me." (Trial Ex. 80; Tr. 159-61.) He also noted: "As we 
agreed verbally, Bob Smith and I will accept $50,000 as payment for our services.... I 
believe we have finished our work at this time and should be paid." (Id.) 
On November 1, 2001, Daines sent his Invoice #9 to ASC Group. (Trial Ex. 10.) 
His purpose was to be reimbursed for $6,000 in out-of-pocket expenses. He wrote on the 
invoice: "$50,000 promised by Boyer Company for Work on Different Sites for WV 
S[urgical] C[enter] building." (Id) The invoice also indicated $6,000 due for "partial fee 
for building portion WV City balance $44,000.00 payable upon signing of lease." (Id.) 
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On December 10, 2001, Daines received a fax letter from Dr. McCray, Chairman 
of the Surgical Center. (Trial Ex. 10; Tr. 161.) That letter specifically referenced 
Daines' Invoice #9, and states: 
Thank you for the services you rendered to West Valley Surgical Center, 
LLC during the due diligence and organizational phase of the 
development. Check No. 1010 in the amount of $6,000.00 representing 
payment towards your fee totaling $50,000 has been prepared by West 
Valley Surgical Center, LLC. The check will be sent you immediately 
upon receipt of the conditional release form attached to this letter. 
As you know, The Boyer Company, Developer, will pay the balance upon 
commencement of the lease for the project. 
(Trial Ex. 10; Tr. 161-62.) 
Enclosed with the December 10 letter was a copy of the Release. (Trial Ex. 10.) 
Daines read the Release, signed it and faxed it back, (Id; Tr. 103, 162-63.) No one 
forced him to sign. (Id. at 163.) Shortly after he sent it back to ASC Group, he received 
a check for $6,000. (Id. at 163; Trial Ex. 61.) In March or April 2003 he received a 
check for $50,000. (Id. at 163; Trial Ex. 63.) Daines offered no testimony at trial 
concerning an alternative understanding or interpretation of the Release. 
2. After Considering Daines' Evidence and Inferences in Their 
Most Favorable Light, the Trial Court Properly Determined 
That No Ambiguity Existed and That the Release Could Be 
Interpreted as a Matter of Law. 
After hearing and considering all of the evidence Daines presented on the issue of 
ambiguity, the trial court determined that the Release was unambiguous on its face, that 
Daines had presented no extrinsic evidence to establish a latent ambiguity in the Release, 
and that the Release discharged his claims against Defendants as a matter of law: 
The Release is clear and unambiguous as a matter of law. . . . 
Plaintiff offered no evidence that would support an alternative 
interpretation of the Release that is plausible and reasonable in light of the 
language used in the Release. . . . The construction and interpretation of 
the Release is therefore a question of law for the Court. 
(R. at 1669, U 14, 1672, f 26.) 
Nothing in the marshaled evidence supports Daines' new argument on appeal that 
the Release was ambiguous as to "pre-Surgical Center ASC." There is no factual support 
for this argument anywhere in the trial record. As noted above, the express language of 
the Release includes both "pre" and "post" Surgical Center services. {Supra at Argument 
§ 1(A)) Indeed, both ASC Group and some of the individual physicians acted as 
organizers, members, and managers of the Surgical Center. As "members," they were 
discharged from any claims (pre- and post-formation of the Surgical Center) as long as 
they were within the scope of the services listed in the Release. 
Daines points to his Invoice #9 in support of his argument that he was being paid 
only for his activities in connection with the "acquisition of real estate" for the Surgical 
Center, and for certain out-of-pocket expenses. He also argues that it is a 
"contemporaneous document" and should be used to interpret the Release. These 
arguments fail for two reasons. 
First, the Surgical Center responded to his invoice a month later with a letter that 
is inconsistent with Daines' interpretation. (Trial Ex. 10.) Enclosed with the letter was 
the Release, which expressly discharged not only claims relating to the "acquisition of 
real estate," but also discharged claims for services relating to "due diligence" and claims 
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for "other services" rendered during the "organization, development and operation" of the 
Surgical Center. (Trial Ex. 10.) Payment of the first $6,000 was conditioned on signing 
the Release. Daines signed the Release and accepted the money. 
Second, Invoice #9 is not a "contemporaneous" document that must be considered 
in construing the Release. (Appellant's Br. 37-38.) The contemporaneous writing rule 
applies only to contracts or agreements that were contemporaneously executed by the 
parties. See, e.g., Tretheway v. Furstenau, 2001 UT App 400, If 9, 40 P.3d 649, 652 
("[W]hen two agreements are executed substantially contemporaneously and are clearly 
interrelated, they must be construed as a whole and harmonized if possible." (internal 
quotations omitted)); see also Winegar, 813 P.2d at 109 (involving two 
contemporaneously executed "agreements"); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'I Bank, 731 P.2d 
225, 229 (Utah 1987) (involving contemporaneously executed "contract" and warranty 
deed). Invoice #9 was sent by Daines more than a month before he received the letter 
from the Surgical Center and signed the Release, and the terms of the invoice were never 
agreed to by the Surgical Center, ASC Group, or any other relevant party. 
The only document that could be construed as a contemporaneous writing is the 
letter from Dr. McCray to Daines. See Brown v. Financial Serv. Corp, 489 F.2d 144, 
149-50 (5th Cir. 1974) (cover letter transmitting signed contract, and summarizing its 
terms, may be considered in interpreting the agreement). That letter transmitted the 
Release and is consistent with language of the Release. (Trial Ex. 10.) It is not 
consistent with the interpretation of the Release Daines now urges. Both Dr. McCray's 
cover letter and the Release make it clear that the $50,000 fee Daines was to receive from 
Boyer was intended to compensate him for all of his services relating to the Surgical 
Center.22 (Id.) Daines read both of these documents, and voluntarily signed the Release 
without taking any steps to clarify its terms, limit its scope, exclude ASC Group as a 
covered party, or otherwise preserve any claims he might have had against ASC Group 
relating to the eight Shares. In light of all of this evidence, no reasonable jury could 
conclude that Daines intended the Release to apply only to his "real estate acquisition" 
efforts,23 or to exclude from its scope any claims he might have against ASC Group 
arising out of an oral agreement for the eight Shares. 
In sum, Daines presented no extrinsic evidence to support a reasonable and 
plausible alternative interpretation of the Release or to establish that it was not intended 
to apply to all claims Daines might have had against ASC Group relating to the Surgical 
Center, including his claim to the eight Shares. As such, the trial court's ruling that the 
Release discharged all of Daines' claims against ASC Group as a matter of law was 
correct, and the directed verdict should be affirmed. 
Daines claims that this cover letter links the Release only to the $6,000 payment, 
and not to the $50,000 payment from Boyer. The cover letter for the Release expressly 
states, however, that the $6,000.00 check "represented] payment towards [Daines'] fee 
totaling $50,000." (Trial Ex. 10.) 
3
 Daines argues that because the $50,000 came from Boyer the Release must have 
applied only to his site selection efforts. There is no evidence of Daines performing any 
services for or at the request of Boyer. It is undisputed that Boyer paid the money as the 
selected developer, on behalf of and at the request of the Surgical Center and its 
members. (Trial Ex. 10.) 
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C. Whether the Release Contains a True "Integration" Clause or Just 
Further Exposition of the Scope of the Release Makes No Difference to 
the Outcome. 
Daines attacks the trial court's conclusion that certain language in the Release was 
an integration clause. (Appellant's Br, 41-43.) The disputed language states: 'This 
release encompasses and satisfies any prior agreements and discussions whether written 
or verbal by West Valley Surgical Center, LLC or any of its members." (Trial Ex. 10). 
Daines argues that this is not a true integration clause because it does not state that the 
document constitutes "the entire agreement of the parties." (Appellant's Br. 42) 
The real issue, however, is not what label to attach to the sentence, but what the 
sentence means, and how it impacts Dairies' claims for the eight Shares. Whether it is 
labeled as an integration clause or merely a further expression of the intended scope of 
the Release, the language makes it clear and unambiguous that the Release "encompasses 
and satisfies any prior agreements" Daines might have had with the Surgical Center or 
any of its members, including ASC Group. Thus, the Release expressly includes the 
MOU and the oral agreement for the eight Shares—both "prior agreements," one written 
and one "verbal"—that are expressly satisfied and discharged by the Release. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED A DIRECTED VERDICT 
DISMISSING DAINES' CLAIMS AGAINST VINCENT BECAUSE 
DAINES PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE THAT VINCENT DEALT WITH 
DAINES IN AN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY. 
Daines implicitly acknowledges that he must present evidence that Vincent dealt 
with Daines in his individual capacity, rather than as a representative of ASC Group, in 
order to escape a directed verdict. (Appellant's Br. 43.) But, instead of citing evidence 
of what Vincent said or did that might create individual liability, Daines cites only 
evidence of what he, Daines, assumed. (See id. at 43-44.) Mostly, Daines cites to his 
counsel's arguments below, which are not themselves evidence. (Id.) 
Daines' entire testimony concerning the oral agreement, for which he seeks to 
hold Vincent personally liable, was as follows: 
Q. When did you go see Mr. Vincent? 
A. December 13th of 2000. 
Q. Where did the meeting take place? 
A. In Park City in his office.24 
Q. Who was present at that meeting? 
A. Just the two of us. 
Q. Just the two of you? And what was discussed at that time? 
A. We discussed my concerns about being tough on the contract when 
they [ASC Group] were paying me and that was the basis of our 
conversation. 
Q. And let me ask you, by that time had an agreement been signed up 
with the ASC Group [and the doctors]? 
A. No, that wasn't signed up until February 13. 
Q. So what was Mr. Vincent's reaction to your conversation with him, 
to you telling him how uncomfortable you felt? 
A. His reaction was, "Well, I think we can take care of this if you come 
on our side of the table and you get a ^hare, then you'll be 
negotiating for yourself and for the doctors, and you can do it in 
good faith. 
24 The offices to which Daines refers are ASC Group's offices in Park City. (Tr. 99-102.) 
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Q. Okay. So what did he tell you, as best as you can remember, at that 
time? 
A. Told me that I would get eight shares. 
Q. And did you ask him whether or not you would be accepting the 
eight shares? 
A. I told him that I would accept the eight shares, yes. 
Q. And did he give you any reasons why you should be accepting 
them? 
A. Well, he told me that it would be an annuity and I knew what the 
facts were and when he said that would be an annuity, I thought 
that's a darn good deal because I know what the figures are. 
Q. Did you discuss with him at that time that you had $150,000 coming 
under the Memorandum of Understanding and what was going to 
happen to that money?25 
A, Yes. 
Q. What did you say? 
A, Well, I said to him if I forego the $150,000 that means that you can 
buy my eight shares for $68,000 which will save you money and be 
of a benefit to you. In the discussion before I said - or we agreed 
upon the eight shares. 
Q. What was your general discussion with Mr. Vincent? 
A. Well, I don't think - I may have shook hands with him, I don't 
remember the exact thing, but I felt satisfied. I thought he was 
satisfied. I thought we had a good agreement. By that time I had 
what I considered a special relationship with him. I - well, I was - 1 
found out that he - I'm LDS, he's LDS, he's a bishop, a returned 
25
 The MOU was signed by Vincent in his representative capacity and obligated ASC 
Group or the Surgical Center to pay the $150,000 finder's fee. (Trial Ex. 2.) Vincent had 
no personal obligation to pay this amount. (Id) 
missionary, as Mr. Hayward is and I thought I could rely on his 
word. 
(Tr. 79-81.) 
There is nothing in Daines' testimony that would support, directly or by inference, 
a finding that Vincent made an oral agreement in any capacity other than as Chairman of 
ASC Group. No reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that Vincent was 
promising as an individual to give Daines eight Shares of the Surgical Center. Indeed, 
Daines' own testimony is that Vincent used the plural pronouns "we" and "our" when he 
said "T think we can take care of this if you come on our side of the table and you get a 
share.'" (Id. at 79-80.) Daines' counsel conceded as much when he argued that the 
Release of the Surgical Center did not apply to the eight Shares agreement because it 
"was a deal between Mr. Daines and ASC, a totally separate entity." (Id. at 290.) 
Conspicuously absent from the record is any testimony that Vincent said that he 
personally would have or give any shares to Daines. 
Even though Daines is entitled to have the evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to him, he cannot ignore undisputed documentary evidence. The unchallenged 
organizational documents for the Surgical Center establish that Shares in the Surgical 
Center could be owned only by the physicians and ASC Group. (Trial Exs. 56, 57.) It 
Daines' brief mentions numerous times (with emphasis) his testimony that he relied 
on Vincent's membership and leadership position in the LDS Church. (Appellant's Br. 
10 n. 34, 44 n. 142, 46 n. 151.) Daines suggests that his reliance somehow is evidence of 
a claim against Vincent, individually. If anything could be inferred from this testimony 
(a dubious proposition at best), a stronger inference could be drawn that Vincent was 
acting in an ecclesiastical capacity than that he was acting in an individual capacity. 
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was also unchallenged at trial that no one other than ASC Group could hold more than 5 
Shares. Id. These restrictions could only be changed by a vote of the majority of the 
Board of Managers of the Surgical Center. (Trial Exs. 56, 57; Tr. 255-56.) It is therefore 
undisputed that at the time Daines says the oral agreement was made, Vincent did not 
own, and could not have owned, any Shares in the Surgical Center, let alone the eight 
Shares Daines says were promised to him. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could infer 
that Vincent was acting in an individual capacity in this meeting with Daines. 
In sum, Daines offered no evidence from which a jury could find that Vincent 
made a promise as an individual to give Daines eight Shares. The trial court therefore 
properly granted Vincent's motion for directed verdict and the order should be affirmed. 
IIL THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED A VERDICT AGAINST 
DAINES ON HIS FRAUD CLAIM BECAUSE DAINES PRESENTED NO 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SEVERAL OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS 
OF THAT CLAIM, 
Daines alleged that he was fraudulently induced to relinquish his right to receive 
$150,000 under the MOU and sought compensatory and punitive damages. To prevail on 
his fraud claim Daines is required to establish by clear and convincing evidence: 
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact (3) which was false and (4) which the representor either (a) 
knew to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that there was 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation, (5) for 
the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it and (6) that the other 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely 
upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and 
damage. 
See, e.g., Armed Forces Ins. Exch v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, If 16, 70 P.3d 35, 40 (internal 
quotations omitted). Because the fraud alleged by Daines is based on the promise of future 
performance (i.e., the promise to transfer to Daines eight of ASC Group's Shares in the 
Surgical Center), Daines was required to establish that Appellees had no intent to perform 
the alleged promise at the time it was made. See Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture 
No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982). See also The Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door 
Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[A] misrepresentation of intended 
future performance is not a representation concerning a 'presently existing fact' upon 
which a claim for fraud can be based unless [the plaintiff] can prove that [the defendant], 
at the time of the representation, did not intend to perform the promise and made the 
representation for the purpose of deceiving [the plaintiff].")-
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Daines, a jury could find that 
ASC Group promised to give Daines eight of the Shares it would later receive when the 
Surgical Center was formed. But there was no evidence to establish that at the time the 
oral agreement was made ASC Group did not intend to keep the promise. Daines' 
cursory briefing on this element simply states a conclusion—"they did not intend to 
transfer such shares," without any supporting citation to the record. (Appellant's Br. 45.) 
There is no evidence of any such intent. Daines did not call Vincent or Dan 
Tasset,27 CEO of ASC Group, both of whom were present during the entire trial, to 
Daines seeks to rely on deposition testimony from Mr. Tasset to establish that ASC 
Group viewed Daines' purported contributions to the formation of the Surgical Center as 
a "gift/5 suggesting that this somehow demonstrates fraudulent intent. (Appellant's Br. 
47 n. 154.) Daines' reliance on this evidence is improper and unavailing. Even assuming 
that such evidence has any relevance on the question of intent, the deposition testimony 
was never offered at trial, and cannot be considered on appeal. See, e.g., Pratt v. Mitchell 
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establish the company's intent. The only thing Daines points to is the fact that none of 
the term sheets, the PPM or the Operating Agreement contain any provision for giving 
Daines his eight Shares. But Daines ignores the fact that he was in the middle of the 
negotiations of those terms with ASC Group, acting as a representative of the physicians. 
Those negotiations culminated in the PPM and the Operating Agreement, both of which 
provide that no one other than ASC Group could purchase or hold Class II Shares in the 
Surgical Center, and that no one but ASC Group could hold more than five Shares in the 
Surgical Center. (Trial Exs. 54, 56.) The fact that later events, in which Daines 
participated, rendered it impossible for ASC Group to actually transfer the eight Shares to 
Daines hardly demonstrates that ASC Group had no present intention of keeping its 
promise to transfer such shares at the time the promise was allegedly made. 
The other essential element of fraud for which Daines offered no evidence is that 
he reasonably and detrimentally acted in reliance on the promise. Daines testified that he 
gave up his right to receive $150,000 under the MOU, but there is no evidence that he 
irrevocably gave up any rights under the MOU (until he signed the later Release). The 
most that can be said is that he deferred asserting a claim under the MOU for a couple of 
months until it became clear from the term sheets, the PPM and the Operating Agreement 
that he was not going to receive either cash or Shares in the Surgical Center. Indeed, 
Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991) ("Depositions that were never 
introduced into evidence nor read by the trial judge will not be considered on appeal.")' 
Moreover, whether or not Mr. Tasset thought that Daines should "gift" his services to the 
Surgical Center being created for his physician clients has no bearing on the intent of the 
company at the time the alleged oral agreement for eight Shares was made. 
until he signed the Release and accepted the $56,000 payments, there was nothing that 
would have prevented Daines from asserting a claim under the MOU for the $150,000 
finders' fee. Accordingly, Daines failed to establish the essential elements of reasonable 
and detrimental reliance, and the trial court properly granted Defendants' motion for 
directed verdict on Daines' fraud and punitive damage claims. 
IV. DAINES HAD HIS DAY IN COURT AND WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF ANY 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Daines argues that by granting Appellees' motions for directed verdict, the trial 
court deprived him of the constitutional right to his day in court and to a trial by jury. 
(Appellant's Br. 48-49.) As a threshold matter, Daines failed to raise this issue in the 
trial court, and it should not be considered on appeal. See Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 
12, Tf 18, 114 P.3d 546, 550 ("It is well-established that we generally will not address 
issues raised for the first time on appeal unless a party can demonstrate exceptional 
circumstances." (citations omitted)); State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990) (rule 
applies even where issue involves a constitutional right). 
In any event, the granting of the motion for directed verdict was either proper or 
not proper. If it was not proper, the case will be remanded for retrial. If it was properly 
granted, then Daines had his "day in court" but failed to meet the his burden of proof. In 
neither case are the constitutional rights to open courts and a trial by jury even 
implicated.28 
28 
Daines suggests that the trial judge granted the directed verdicts because she did 
not find him credible, thereby violating his constitutional rights. (Appellant's Br. 49.) 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER EXCLUDING THE LIBSCOMB ORDER 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED, 
A, Daines Failed to Adequately Brief This Issue and It Should Not Be 
Considered on Appeal. 
An appellant has the burden to adequately brief the issues raised on appeal, and to 
fully set forth and analyze the specific reasons why the trial court's ruling was erroneous 
and should be reversed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), This burden requires '"not just 
bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based 
on that authority.'" Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 2004 UT App 37, ] 15, 86 P.3d 767, 771 
(quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 229, 305 (Utah 1998)). See also Dahl Inv. Co. v. 
Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, f 7, 101 P.3d 830, 832 n. 2 (refusing to address issue where 
appellant's "opening brief merely raise[d] the issue without offering any analysis."). The 
appellant's burden is not met by the mere incorporation of pleadings submitted below, or 
by citation to portions of the record without explanation. See, e.g., Jensen v. Sawyers, 
2005 UT 81, «! 134, 130 P.3d 325, 350 (refusing to consider cross-appellant's claim for 
There is no basis for such allegations, and it is improper for Daines to even imply such 
judicial misconduct. See, e.g., Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass'n, 2007 UT 2, 
ffif 8-9. Although Judge Lewis expressed doubt about Daines' credibility during the 
hearing on the motions for directed verdict (a hearing held outside the presence of the 
jury), and noted her reservations about Daines' ability to prove his claims, she 
nonetheless assumed as true all of the facts presented by Daines on those issues. See R. 
at 1668 ("The Court has serious doubts whether there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence to support a finding that an oral contract was formed and doubts that any 
reasonably jury could so find. But it is not necessary to make this determination in order 
to resolve the motion for a directed verdict. Accordingly, and for the purposes of this 
motion, the Court will assume that an oral agreement was made."). See also Tr. 289 
("Well, I understand your theory which I do not find to be credible. The issue, however, 
is not what I find credible or what I would do as a finder of fact. The issue is whether 
there is anything to go to the jury."). 
attorney fees where he merely invited court to review submissions below); Rasmussen v. 
Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 392 n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (declining to consider whether 
appellant was improperly limited in examining her expert where opening brief did "not 
analyze individual rulings of the trial court regarding expert testimony," and simply 
attached "substantial portion[s] of the transcript and invite[d] [the court] to ferret out the 
errors and make her arguments for her."). 
Daines' opening brief does not analyze the controlling law or articulate the 
specific reasons why the trial court's order excluding the Libscomb Order was an abuse 
of discretion and should be reversed. (Appellant's Br. 47-48.) Instead, Daines provides a 
cursory and totally undeveloped statement about why the Libscomb Order should have 
been allowed into evidence, inviting this Court to review his briefing below to determine 
the specific basis for reversal. (Id. at 47-48.) Daines cites to just two cases, without 
providing any analysis of their holdings, or explanation as to why they require reversal. 
(Id. at 48 n. 160.) Daines' briefing on the Libscomb Order is woefully inadequate, and 
this Court should therefore decline to consider the issue on appeal. 
B. The Trial Court's Order Excluding the Libscomb Order Was Within 
Its Discretion and Should be Affirmed.29 
The trial court's order excluding the Libscomb Order should be affirmed for four 
reasons. First, the Lipscomb Order constitutes a statement by an absent declarant (Judge 
Given the paucity of briefing by Daines, this section sets forth an abbreviated 
argument supporting affirmance. If this Court elects to consider the issue, and to 
consider the arguments set forth in Daines' pleadings below, it should also consider 
Defendant's prior briefing, which more fully sets forth the reasons why the Libscomb 
Order is inadmissible and was therefore properly excluded. (R. at 630-48.) 
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Hilder) being offered for the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., that Vincent was not a 
credible witness in that case), and is therefore classic hearsay inadmissible under Utah 
Rules of Evidence 801 and 802.30 
Second, the Libscomb Order constitutes evidence of Vincent's character which 
may be admitted under Utah Rule of Evidence 404 only if it is offered for "a proper, 
noncharacter purpose." See State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, f^ 16, 108 P.3d 730, 734. Daines 
suggests that the Libscomb Order is admissible under Rule 404(b) to demonstrate a 
"specific instance of misconduct." (Appellant's Br. 48.) This statement amounts to a 
tacit admission that Daines sought to use the Libscomb Order to establish that Vincent 
lied about a prior transaction in a prior case and is therefore lying now. This is not a 
proper, non-character purpose under Rule 404(b). 
Third, the Libscomb Order is inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 608. Rule 
608(a) permits testimony "concerning a witness's general character or reputation for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness but prohibits any testimony as to a witness's truthfulness on 
a particular occasion" State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1989) (emphasis 
added). At most, the Lipscomb Order contains opinions regarding the credibility of 
particular testimony by Vincent in one prior case; it does not evidence Vincent's overall 
reputation for truthfulness. In any event, Rule 608(b) expressly prevents a party from 
30
 The only exception that could possibly apply is the "public records and reports" 
exception set forth in Utah Rule of Evidence 803(8), and judicial findings do not fall 
within the scope of that exception. See Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1192 (101" Cir. 
2002). 
using "extrinsic evidence" to "attack[] the credibility of a witness." See United States v. 
MangiamelU 668 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (10th Cir. 1982).31 The Libscomb Order is extrinsic 
evidence. 
Fourth, the Libscomb Order is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial and thus 
inadmissible under Utah Rules of Evidence 402 and 403. The Lipscomb Order is of little 
probative value in resolving any of the factual disputes in this case because it is only one 
court's assessment of the facts and credibility in an unrelated matter. The facts 
underlying the Lipscomb Order also differ substantially from the allegations in this 
litigation, and its admission would have required the trial court to conduct a mini-trial on 
the basis for the Lipscomb Order and its relevance to this case. See, e.g., State v. Vargas, 
2001 UT 5, If 34, 20 P.3d 271, 279-80 (excluding evidence of a witness's prior 
untruthfulness in court as it would require a "trial within a trial. . . . [which would] 
distract from the issues that are at trial."). Finally, the Lipscomb Order contains 
extremely negative language rejecting Vincent's account of the underlying facts and 
disparaging Vincent's testimony in that case, presenting an undue risk of extreme 
prejudice toward Defendants. 
Daines argues that the Libscomb Order is admissible for purposes of impeachment. 
(Appellant's Br. 47.) Any inquiries into specific instances of conduct that are probative 
of truthfulness or untruthfulness are subject to the Court's discretion, however, and the 
evidentiary prerequisites of Utah Rules of Evidence 402 and 403 apply. See Utah R. 
Evid. 608(b). The Libscomb Order does not pass muster under these related evidentiary 
rules, and thus cannot be offered even for this limited purpose. See infra this section, 
paragraph 4. 
Daines suggests that all of these concerns can be cured with a limiting instruction. 
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For any and all of these reasons, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
excluding all reference to the Libscomb Order, and its order should be affirmed. 
C. Any Error in Excluding the Libscomb Order Was Harmless. 
"An erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence does not constitute reversible 
error unless the error is harmful. An error is harmful if it is reasonably likely that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Jensen v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 2003 UT 51, 
^ 100, 82 P.3d 1076, 1096. See also Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 
740 P.2d 1296, 1303-04 (Utah 1987). 
Even assuming some error in the exclusion of the Libscomb Order, the exclusion 
had no impact on the trial court's ruling. Daines' sole purpose in offering the Libscomb 
Order would have been to impeach Vincent's credibility in the eyes of the jury. 
(Appellant's Br 47-48.) The trial court entered directed verdicts in favor of Defendants 
based on a legal interpretation of the Release, and on Daines' failure to present evidence 
necessary to meet his burden and establish the essential elements of his claims. Vincent 
was never called as a witness at trial, and his credibility had no bearing on the trial 
court's decision. Exclusion of the Libscomb Order was therefore harmless, and any error 
does not require reversal on appeal. 
(Appellant's Br. 48.) The proposed instruction, allowing the jury to rely on the Libscomb 
Order to determine whether "Vincent makes promises in business transactions upon which he 
does not deliver," does not cure, but rather highlights the highly prejudicial effect of the 
order. This suggestion demonstrates the improper use Daines seeks to make of the Libscomb 
Order. 
VI. APPELLEES FILED THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS THE APPEAL IN 
GOOD FAITH, AND APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO SANCTIONS, 
Appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction has 
been voluntarily withdrawn as moot. (Sup. Ct. Docket No. 18.) The trial court entered a 
final judgment on October 11, 2006 (R. at 1717-1933), and Appellees concede that this 
Court then had subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal (Sup. Ct. Docket No. 18.) 
Appellees' motion was nonetheless brought in good faith, and thus there is no 
basis for an award of sanctions. Appellees' motion asserted that Daines' notice of appeal 
was premature because no final judgment had yet been entered. The law is clear that a 
premature notice of appeal does not vest this Court with jurisdiction over the appeal. See, 
e.g., Glasscock v. State, 2003 UT App 254, 2003 WL 21664764, at *1 (July 13, 2003); 
State v. Caballero, 2005 UT App 59, 2005 WL 314455, at *1 (Feb. 10, 2005); Turville v. 
J&J Properties, L.C, 2004 UT App 389, 2004 WL 2404688, at *1 (Oct. 28, 2004); 
Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Although 
subsequent action by the trial court may ripen a previously premature notice of appeal 
into a timely notice, there is nothing improper about a motion to dismiss filed before such 
events occur. See Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 392 (Utah 1983) ("The premature 
filing of the notice of appeal . . . is an irregularity which would be grounds for dismissal 
of the appeal within the discretion of the court." (quotations omitted)).34 
A copy of the "Judgment" may be found at Addendum Exhibit 22 to Appellant's 
Brief. 
Appellees' motion was particularly appropriate in this case insofar as Daines 
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Daines' argument for sanctions is based on Appellees' failure to cite to and 
distinguish ProMax Dev. Corp. v Raile, 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254, holding that an 
outstanding request for costs does not affect the finality of an otherwise final judgment. 
This argument cannot be sustained. As a threshold matter, the inadvertent failure of a 
party to discover and distinguish contrary authority is not an adequate grounds for 
sanctions. See, e.g., Beddoes v. Giffin, 2006 UT App 130, No. 20051154-CA, 2006 WL 
829112, at *1 (Mar. 30, 2006) (refusing to award sanctions against appellant despite fact 
that arguments were inconsistent with ProMax). 
In any event, ProMax was not controlling. Appellees' motion to dismiss was not 
based solely on the fact that the issue of costs remained unresolved. Appellees 
specifically argued that the orders were not otherwise final judgments because they 
expressly stated that "[jJudgment shall be entered" in favor of Defendants, and against 
Daines, dismissing Daines' claims against Defendants "with prejudice." (R. at 1655, 
1659, 1673.) This argument is supported by controlling law, and distinguishes the instant 
case from ProMax. See State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, If 9, 65 P.3d 1180, 1182 
("[WJhere further action is contemplated by the express language of the order, it cannot 
be a final determination susceptible of enforcement."); State v. Duccini, 2006 UT App 
407 No. 20060725, 2006 WL 2834553 (Oct. 5, 2006) (memorandum decision denying 
attempted to use its premature notice of appeal as a basis to divest the district court of 
jurisdiction over Appellees' then-pending request for costs. See R. at 1701 ("The orders 
entered by the trial court on August 22, 2006, were appealed to the Supreme Court on 
September 8, 2006. It is respectfully submitted that the trial Court does not have 
jurisdiction to rule upon defendant's request for an award of costs."). 
motion to withdraw guilty plea was not a final, appellable order because it required state 
to prepare and submit an order in conformity therewith). Appellant's request for 
sanctions should therefore be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm all three of the trial court's 
directed verdicts and the trial court's order excluding all use or reference to the Libscomb 
Order, and deny Appellant's request for sanctions. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2007. 
^/XfVWsStSK 
FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM 
MICHAEL P. PETROGEORGE 
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Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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A. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) 
B. Utah Rule of Evidence 402 
C. Utah Rule of Evidence 403 
D. Utah Rule of Evidence 404 
E. Utah Rule of Evidence 608 
F. Utah Rule of Evidence 801 
G. Utah Rule of Evidence 802 
H. Utah Rule of Evidence 803(8) 
I. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) 
Appellees' Addendum Tab A 
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Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) 
Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect 
A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an 
opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having 
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. A 
motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even 
though all parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a directed 
verdict shall state the specific ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a 
motion for a directed verdict is effective without any assent of the jury. 
Appellees' Addendum Tab B 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 402 
Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Appellees' Addendum Tab C 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 403 
Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Appellees' Addendum Tab D 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 404 
Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes 
(a) Character evidence generally 
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of 
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused 
Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged 
victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), 
evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of alleged victim 
Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character 
trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide 
case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness 
Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the 
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of 
trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature 
of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
Appellees' Addendum Tab E 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 608 
Evidence of character and conduct of witness 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of 
opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is 
admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by 
opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct 
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting 
the witness' character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of 
the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness1 character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of 
another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate 
as a waiver of the accused's or the witness1 privilege against self-incrimination when 
examined with respect to matters that relate only to character for truthfulness. 
(c) Evidence of bias 
Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness 
either by examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced. 
Appellees' Addendum Tab F 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 801 
Definitions 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement 
A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it 
is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant 
A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay 
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial 
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay 
A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness 
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's 
testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) 
consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; 
or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent 
The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in 
either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the 
party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a 
person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) 
a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of 
the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a 
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
Appellees' Addendum Tab G 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 802 
Hearsay rule 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
Appellees' Addendum Tab H 
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Utah Rule 803(8) 
Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available 
as a witness: 
(8) Public records and reports 
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or 
agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed 
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, 
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the 
Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made 
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
Appellees' Addendum Tab I 
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Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) 
Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees 
Damages for delay or frivolous appeal 
Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion 
made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the damages 
be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
